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A GOOD RULE, POORLY WRITTEN: HOW THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTED THE 
INADEQUACY OF IOLTA RATE RULES 
Andrew Arthur+ 
“If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou 
shalt not ration justice.”1  This ethos underlies a variety of programs designed to 
provide needy Americans with access to the judicial system, including the 
IOLTA program.2  IOLTA, an acronym for “Interest on Lawyers’ Trust 
Accounts,” is a partnership between banks and the legal community where banks 
pay interest on attorneys’ short-term deposit balances held in trust for the 
attorneys’ clients.3  Although the interest earned on any particular account may 
be insignificant, its impact is magnified when it is aggregated with interest from 
IOLTA accounts statewide to fund legal services programs.4  The impact is also 
directly influenced by the prevailing interest rates banks pay on IOLTA 
balances,5 with minimum rates governed by rules in almost every state.6  Since 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2003, University of North Carolina at Greensboro.  The author would like to thank Professor Heidi 
Schooner for her insight and expertise in refining the focus of this paper.  He would also like to 
thank his wife, Praneetha, for her limitless patience and love, and the entire Arthur family for their 
constant encouragement and support.  Finally, the author owes a debt of gratitude to the members 
of the Catholic University Law Review, whose efforts contributed immeasurably to the quality of 
this Comment. 
 1. Thou Shall Not Ration Justice, THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y, http://www.legal-aid.org/ 
en/las/thoushaltnotrationjustice.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (quoting Honorable Learned Hand, 
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 75th Anniversary Address 
at the Legal Aid Society of New York (Feb. 16, 1951)). 
 2. See, e.g., id.  see also Kentucky IOLTA Fund, KY. BAR ASS’N, http://www.kybar.org/63 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (illustrating the use of Judge Learned Hand’s quote on an IOLTA 
website). 
 3. See Dru Stevenson, Rethinking IOLTA, 76 MO. L. REV. 455, 456–57 (2011) (discussing 
the basic operation of IOLTA programs). 
 4. Id. at 457; see also What is IOLTA?, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2014) (“Without taxing the public, and at no cost to lawyers or their clients, interest 
from lawyer trust accounts is pooled to provide civil legal aid to the poor and support improvements 
to the justice system.”). 
 5. See Terry Carter, No Longer Flush IOLTA Programs Find New Funding to Support Legal 
Services, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2013, at 61 (“When the Federal Reserve announced in December 2008 
that it was lowering the interest rate to virtually zero, it had the effect of nearly zeroing out a 
mainstay in funding civil legal services for the poor: interest on lawyers’ trust accounts, aka 
IOLTA.”). 
 6. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(k) (2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
6212(b) (West 2014); FLA. ST. BAR R. 5-1.1(g)(5)(B) (West 2014); MD. CT. R. 16-610(b)(1)(D)(i); 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9(c)(1)–(3) (2015); S.C. APP. CT. R. 412(c)(2)(A)–
(B); TEX. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. R. 7(a)(1)–(2) (West 2009); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
20:1.15(cm)(4); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15A(b)(3) (2012). 
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its adoption, IOLTA has become a significant part of states’ legal aid program 
funding.7 
IOLTA came to the United States by way of programs that were first 
developed in Canada and Australia over forty years ago.8  In 1981, the Florida 
Bar Association Foundation started the first IOLTA program in the United States 
and IOLTA programs now exist in every state.9  During its implementation, 
however, it faced numerous legal challenges under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Taking and Just Compensation clauses.10  Opponents argued that the program 
constituted a state taking of interest that rightfully belonged to clients whose 
funds were held in trust.11  The Supreme Court settled this issue in Brown v. 
Legal Foundation of Washington, holding that IOLTA programs did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment.12 
With constitutional issues resolved for the time being, the principal legal 
authority for IOLTA programs now resides in various state statutes,13 court 
rules,14 rules of professional conduct,15 and bar association rules.16  Collectively, 
these rules govern the responsibilities of participating attorneys, the reporting 
and record-keeping requirements, and the terms of eligibility for banks to 
participate as IOLTA depository institutions.17  These eligibility terms include 
the requirements that address the rate of interest to be credited to IOLTA 
accounts.18  These “comparability” requirements require IOLTA deposits to earn 
no less than comparable non-IOLTA deposits or set the required rate at a certain 
                                                 
 7. See Stevenson, supra note 3 at 458–59 (stating that IOLTA programs “generat[e] $150-
250 million every year for legal aid agencies across the nation”) (footnote omitted). 
 8. IOLTA History, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta/iolta-history (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2014). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 466 (2010) (discussing appellate court challenges to 
IOLTA). 
 11. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1998). 
 12. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003) (agreeing with the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “‘[t]here was . . . no constitutional violation 
when’” the petitioners did not receive the interest from the money placed in IOLTA accounts 
“‘[b]ecause of the way the IOLTA program operates, the compensation due [the petitioners] for 
any taking of their property would be nil.’” (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of 
Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 861 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Legal Found. of 
Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003))). 
 13. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.10 (West 2014); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 21, § 7000.9 (2015). 
 14. See, e.g., HAW. SUP. CT. R. 11. 
 15. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2012). 
 16. See, e.g., N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2014). 
 17. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(k). 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
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percentage of the Federal Funds Target Rate (FFTR).19  The FFTR is set 
periodically by the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve.20 
Since the beginning of the Financial Crisis in 2007,21 these rate-setting rules 
have permitted a decline in interest revenue from IOLTA programs.22  IOLTA 
interest rate rules are affected directly or indirectly by the monetary policy of 
the Federal Reserve and low central bank interest rates have kept IOLTA rates 
at historic lows for a six-year period.23  As a result, legal aid programs that rely 
on IOLTA funding continue to face the challenge of seeking other forms of 
revenue or reducing the scope of their services to underprivileged citizens in 
need of legal services.24 
This Comment critically examines how the extraordinary economic 
conditions of the Financial Crisis revealed serious inadequacies in the rules that 
govern IOLTA interest rates and bank participation, which demonstrates an 
unintended negative effect of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy response.  
First, this Comment describes IOLTA’s purpose and adoption and examines the 
current methods used to set minimum rates.  Second, it addresses how 
unforeseeable economic conditions and ensuing monetary policy since 2007 
have adversely and significantly affected IOLTA program revenues and, in turn, 
the administration of legal aid services.  Third, this Comment analyzes how the 
current rules undermine the purpose of IOLTA and permit inconsistent 
participation by banks at the detriment of the IOLTA program and perhaps some 
of the banks themselves.  Finally, given the ethical imperative for supporting 
legal aid programs, this Comment proposes several reforms which would give 
teeth to IOLTA rules and ensure the viability and stability of IOLTA revenues 
to fund legal aid in future years. 
                                                 
 19. See infra Part I.B. 
 20. See Open Market Operations, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 21. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/ 
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (“The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 was not 
a single event but a series of crises that rippled through the financial system and, ultimately, the 
economy.”). 
 22. Stevenson, supra note 3, at 459 (2010) (“Despite its prevalence and popularity, IOLTA 
faces a severe depletion of resources after the 2008 housing and banking crisis.”).  According to 
Professor Stevenson, IOLTA funding is imperiled by “continuously low interest rates, which lead 
to lower amounts of funds collected from IOLTA accounts.”  Id. at 458 n.11. 
 23. See infra Part I.B. 
 24. Carter, supra note 5 (“Some states have tacked on additional court fees, professional fees 
and others that are steered to IOLTA programs.  Many programs engage in outreach to the bar for 
contributions or other ways of steering funds to them.”). 
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I.  EXAMINING IOLTA RULES AND THEIR IMPACTS DURING THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
A.  A Common Purpose, but a Diverse Locus of State Authority 
The central purpose of IOLTA is “to increase access to justice for individuals 
and families living in poverty and to improve our justice system.”25  This idea 
has been consistently and clearly expressed since it “began in Florida in 1971 as 
a result of an investigation into means to provide funds for the improvement of 
the administration of justice.”26  In Pennsylvania, for example, today IOLTA 
funds provide for the “delivery of civil legal assistance to the poor and 
disadvantaged in Pennsylvania by non-profit corporations.”27  Montana’s 
IOLTA program sustains missions “[p]roviding legal services, through both paid 
staff program(s) and pro bono program(s), to Montana’s low income citizens 
who would otherwise be unable to obtain legal assistance; . . . promoting a 
knowledge and awareness of the law; and . . . improving the administration of 
justice.”28  Aside from costs of administering the fund, Arizona must use IOLTA 
revenues to “assist in the delivery of legal services to the poor and law-related 
education programs designed to teach young people, educators and other adults 
about the law, the legal process and the legal system . . . [and] fund studies or 
programs designed to improve the administration of justice.”29  In similar 
language across the country, state IOLTA rules express the program’s mandate 
to deliver legal aid services to those who cannot afford it.30 
Although IOLTA’s purpose is consistent nationwide, individual states have 
chosen varying seats of authority to regulate IOLTA programs.31  IOLTA 
regulations were primarily incorporated within the respective state rules of 
professional conduct regarding the safekeeping of property.32  Other states 
govern IOLTA using court rules that mirror standards expressed in the states’ 
respective rules of professional conduct.33  A small number of states have 
                                                 
 25. What is IOLTA?, supra note 4. 
 26. Petition of N.H. Bar Ass’n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1259 (N.H. 1982). 
 27. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(s)(1) (2014). 
 28. MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(a)(1)–(3) (West 2014). 
 29. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 43(f)(6)(A)–(B). 
 30. See, e.g., D.C. BAR R. XIV, § 1 (West 2014) (stating that the “fundamental function” of 
the IOLTA program is “the support of legal services organizations and administration of justice 
programs.”). 
 31. See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(k) (2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 6212(b) (West 2014); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a)(2) (West 2014); OKLA. ST. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(2) (West 2015); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
1.15(o)(3) (West 2014); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15A (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 43(f); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 11(c)(1)(D)(i); MD. CT. R. 16-
610(b)(1)(D); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 50(1)(B); VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § 4, para. 20. 
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codified IOLTA regulations by statute.34  Still others regulate IOLTA through 
state bar rules.35  Regardless of the type of legal authority chosen by each state, 
almost every regulation contains language establishing a basis to determine 
minimum IOLTA interest rates and banking institution eligibility for 
participation. 
B.  IOLTA Minimum Rate Provisions 
1.  Rate Comparability Provisions 
Included in most states’ IOLTA regulations is a method to calculate the 
minimum interest rate that participating banks must pay on IOLTA accounts.36  
A minority of states’ rules make no provision for any minimum rate of interest 
to be paid.37  However, the majority of state IOLTA rules contain comparability 
provisions that ensure IOLTA accounts are eligible to earn interest that is 
comparable to non-IOLTA accounts of a similar type.38  Comparability 
provisions were not initially common to IOLTA regulations; the Ohio IOLTA 
program was the first to implement rate comparability rules, and a majority of 
                                                 
 34. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4705.10 (West 2014). 
 35. See, e.g., FLA. ST. BAR R. 5-1.1(g)–(k) (West 2014); IDAHO BAR. COMM. R. 1306 (West 
2014); ME. BAR R. 6(a)(2)–(5) (West 2014); MO. BAR R. 4-1.145 (West 2014); N.C. BAR R. ch. 1, 
subch. D., § .1317 (West 2014); UTAH BAR. R. 14-1001 (West 2014). 
 36. See, e.g., UTAH BAR. R. 14-1001(f). 
 37. See ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 43(f)(3); IOWA CT. R. 45.4(3); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.15(f) (West 2014); OR. RULES PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15-2(c) (West 2014); VA. SUP. CT. R. 
pt. 6, § 4(B). 
 38. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(k); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.15(c)(2)(i) (West 2014); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6212(b); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.15(h)(3)(A) (West 2014); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(h) (West 2014); 
D.C. BAR R. XI, § 20(f) (West 2014); FLA. ST. BAR R. 5-1.1(g)(5)(A); GA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.15(II)(c)(2)(iv) (West 2014); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 11(c)(1)(D)(i); IDAHO BAR COMM’N 
R. 1306(b) (West 2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f) (West 2014); IND. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(5) (West 2014); KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(g)(2) 
(West 2014); KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830(4); LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(g)(2) (West 
2014); ME. BAR R. 6(a)(4)(C)(2); MD. CT. R. 16-610(b)(1)(D); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07(g)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2015); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a)(2) (West 2014); MINN. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(o) (West 2014); MO. BAR R. 4-1.145(a)(5) (West 2014); MONT. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c)(1)(D) (West 2014); NEB. CT. R. 1.15; NEV. SUP. CT. R. § 
3-903(B)(4); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 50(1)(B); N.J. CT. R. 1:28A-2(e)(1); N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3) 
(LexisNexis 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 21, § 7000.9; N.C. BAR ch. 1, subch. D., 
§ .1317; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.10(A)(2) (West 2014); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.15(h)(2); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(o)(3); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
1.15(f)(5); S.C. SUP. CT. R. 412(c)(2)(A); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(3)(iv) 
(2014); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 43, § 2 (West 2014); TEX. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. R. 7(a) (West 
2014); UTAH BAR R. 14-1001(f)(1); VT. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15B(a) (West 2014); 
WASH. RULES FOR ENF’T OF LAW. CONDUCT R. 15.7(e)(1) (West 2014); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
20:1.15(cm)(4)(b) (West 2014); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15A(b)(1) (LexisNexis 
2015). 
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states followed thereafter.39  The language of California’s rule is representative 
of comparability provisions nationwide and mandates that “the rate of interest 
or dividends payable on any IOLTA account shall not be less than the interest 
rate or dividends generally paid by the eligible institution to nonattorney 
customers on accounts of the same type meeting the same minimum balance and 
other eligibility requirements as the IOLTA account.”40 
While rate comparability provisions ensure that IOLTA accounts earn at least 
as much as their counterpart non-IOLTA accounts, they do not afford IOLTA 
accounts the limited special protections guaranteed by other minimum rate-
setting rules.41  IOLTA accounts are subject to the same prevailing rate 
conditions that affect deposit accounts generally.42  A variety of factors influence 
deposit rates and, therefore, banks’ rate-setting decisions.43  Depository banks 
earn the majority of their income from net interest income, which is the 
difference between the interest borrowers pay to the bank and the interest the 
banks pay to depositors.44  The difference between the average interest rate the 
bank charges borrowers and the average interest rate the bank pays depositors 
constitutes the bank’s net interest margin.45  Banks strive to set interest rates that 
will produce a healthy interest margin, but must adjust these rates in response to 
the abundance or scarcity of deposits to fund loans as well as the availability and 
                                                 
 39. Linda K. Rexer, The History of IOLTA, A.B.A. DIALOGUE MAG., http://apps.american 
bar.org/legalservices/dialogue/su10/su10_iolta1.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2010) (giving a brief 
overview of the evolution of IOLTA regulations). 
 40. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6212(b); see also CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.15(h)(3)(A) (“The eligible institution shall pay no less on its IOLTA accounts than the highest 
interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers when 
the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications 
on its non-IOLTA accounts.”). 
 41. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (illustrating that IOLTA rules may require 
IOLTA funds to earn rates comparable to non-IOLTA accounts without setting a specific minimum 
interest rate). 
 42. See Rexer, supra note 39 (stating that Ohio’s rule requires lawyers to “hold IOLTA 
accounts only in financial institutions that pay those accounts the same rates as accounts of non-
IOLTA customers”). 
 43. See Laura Bruce, How Interest Rates Are Determined, BANKRATE.COM (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/cd/how-interest-rates-are-determined.aspx (“Interest rates are 
affected by a number of factors.  The Federal Reserve . . . raises and lowers short-term interest rates 
in an effort to maintain . . . stability.”). 
 44. Robert DeYoung & Tara Rice, How Do Banks Make Money? The Fallacies of Fee 
Income, ECON. PERSP., Nov. 2004, at 34, 34–35, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/ 
digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2004/ep_4qtr2004_part3_DeYoung_Rice.pdf 
(“To be sure, the interest margin banks earn by intermediating between depositors and borrowers 
continues to be the primary source of profits for most banking companies.”). 
 45. See id. at 34.  This principle is illustrated in a classic banker’s joke: “According to the ‘3-
6-3 rule,’ bankers paid a 3 percent rate of interest on deposits, charged a 6 percent rate of interest 
on loans, and then headed to the golf course at 3 o’clock.”  Id. 
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demand for credit in the borrowing community.46  One of the many factors that 
determine a bank’s interest rates is the behavior of the Federal Reserve in setting 
central interest rates.47 
Since the onset of the Financial Crisis, a principal objective of the Federal 
Reserve has been to encourage economic activity by individuals and 
businesses.48  A primary tool of this monetary policy has been to significantly 
lower the rates at which most banks lend money.49  The Federal Reserve’s 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which determines monetary policy 
in the United States, manages the Funds Target Rate (FFTR).50  According to 
the FOMC, “monetary policy” comprises “the actions undertaken by a central 
bank, such as the Federal Reserve, to influence the availability and cost of money 
and credit to help promote national economic goals.”51  The FOMC, in 
particular, is responsible for setting monetary policy through “open market 
operations,”52 which are “the purchase and sale of securities in the open market 
by a central bank,”53 and the FFTR is one of its principal tools.54 
Although the FFTR has been set low to optimize economic growth and 
stability, the extended low rates have had a direct impact on depositors’ 
                                                 
 46. See Bruce, supra note 43; see also Hesna Genay & Darrin R. Halcomb, Rising Interest 
Rates, Bank Loans, and Deposits, CHI. FED. LETTER (The Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), 
Nov. 2008, at 1, 1–2, available at https://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/ 
chicago_fed_letter/2004/cflnovember2004_208.pdf (“Historically, rising interest rates have been 
associated with slower growth of bank loans and deposits. . . .  [And] higher interest rates can lead 
to slower loan growth through their effects on deposits.”). 
 47. Bruce, supra note 43. 
 48. What Is The Fed: Monetary Policy, FED. RES. BD. S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/education/ 
teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/monetary-policy (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
 49. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (showing a decline in Bank 
Prime Loan Rates between 2008 and 2013).  “The prime rate is a ‘reference or base rate’ that banks 
use to set the price or interest rate on many of their commercial loans and some of their consumer 
loan products.”  What Is the Prime Rate, and Who Borrows at that Interest Rate?, FED. RES. BANK 
S.F. (June 2005), http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2005/june/prime-
interest-rate. 
 50. Open Market Operations, supra note 20; see also Mark F. Bernstein, The Federal Open 
Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 
111, 111 (1989) (“[T]he FOMC has complete control over the purchase and sale of government 
securities by the Federal Reserve Banks, one of the chief instruments of monetary policy . . . .”). 
 51. About the FOMC, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).  “The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave the 
Federal Reserve responsibility for setting monetary policy.”  Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_openmarketops.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 
2015). 
 54. About the FOMC, supra note 51. 
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interest.55  Consequently, certain depositors who rely on interest income for 
subsistence or retirement are adversely affected.56  The Wall Street Journal has 
observed that the Federal Reserve’s extended strategy of maintaining a low 
FFTR has produced disparate effects that may preserve the economic vitality of 
certain sectors of the economy at the expense of certain individuals: “A long 
spell of low interest rates has created a windfall worth billions to banks, 
mortgage borrowers and others it was designed to benefit. But for many people 
who were counting on their nest eggs, those same low rates can spell trouble.”57 
Rate comparability rules mean that IOLTA accounts, like retirees, now face 
the quandaries posed by sustained periods of low interest rates.58  The current 
rate environment is unprecedented—from IOLTA’s inception in 1981 until 
2008, the average prime rate, or rate at which banks typically lend to their most 
creditworthy customers, ranged from 4.12% to 18.87%.59  By contrast, the 
average prime rate has not surpassed 3.25% since 2009.60  In order for banks to 
ensure a viable net interest margin during that time, they have in turn paid 
interest rates that approach zero.61  IOLTA accounts under rate comparability 
rules, which guarantee the rates offered to all depositors generally, have not been 
exempt from these lower deposit interest rates. 
2.  Federal Funds Target Rate Provisions 
As an alternative to pure rate comparability provisions, many states permit 
participating banks to index their IOLTA rates directly to the FFTR.62  Instead 
                                                 
 55. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also Mark Whitehouse, Fed’s Low 
Interest Rates Crack Retirees’ Nest Eggs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), http:// 
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703410604576216830941163492 (describing how the 
Federal Reserve’s lowering of interest rates harms savers by reducing “income on investments” 
and failing to “compensat[e] for inflation”). 
 56. Whitehouse, supra note 55. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, supra note 49 (showing historical data for Bank 
Prime Loan Rates). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Maryland Consumer & Business Online Rates, BANK AM., https://www.bankof 
america.com/deposits/bank-account-interest-rates.go (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (explaining that 
Bank of America, for example, paid, as of October 18, 2014, three-hundredths of one percent on 
Interest Checking account balances in excess of $100,000 in Maryland). 
 62. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(k) (2012); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.15(c)(2)(i) (West 2014); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(h)(3)(A) (West 
2014); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.15(h) (West 2014); D.C. BAR R. XI, § 20(f) (West 
2014); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 1306(b) (West 2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f) 
(West 2014); ME. BAR R. 6(a)(4)(C)(2) (West 2014); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.15(o) (West 2014); MO. BAR R. 4-1.145(a)(5) (West 2014); N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3) 
(LexisNexis 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9 (2015); N.C. BAR ch. 1, subch. 
D., § .1317(b)(3) (West 2014); S.C. SUP. CT. R. 412(c)(2)(A); UTAH BAR R. 14-1001(f)(1) (West 
2014); WASH. RULES FOR ENF’T OF LAW. CONDUCT R. 15.7(e)(1) (West 2014). 
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of focusing on the rates paid on other accounts, these states authorize banks to 
use the FFTR as a basis for determining the minimum IOLTA interest rates to 
be paid by eligible participating banks.63  A common formulation of this type of 
rule gives banks the choice between paying a rate comparable to the rate offered 
to non-IOLTA customers, or, instead, paying a rate based on the FFTR.64  Rate 
rules that provide this option typically express the rate requirement as a 
percentage of the FFTR; the percentage of the FFTR to be paid currently varies 
by state from fifty-five percent to eighty percent of the FFTR.65 
Some states pair FFTR-based interest rates with an absolute rate floor.66  In 
Illinois, for example, “[a]s an alternative to the [rate comparability provision] 
the financial institution may pay a ‘safe harbor’ yield equal to 70% of the Federal 
Funds Target Rate or 1.0%, whichever is higher.”67  A safe harbor rate seeks to 
ensure that actual interest rates paid on IOLTA accounts remain above a certain 
                                                 
 63. See supra note 62. 
 64. See, e.g., IDAHO R. BAR. COMM. R. 1306.  It states: 
An eligible financial institution may satisfy the comparability requirements of subsection 
(b) by electing one of the following options: (1) establish the IOLTA account as the 
comparable rate product; (2) pay the comparable rate on the IOLTA account in lieu of 
actually establishing the comparable rate or dividend product; or (3) pay a rate equal to 
the greater of 70%, or such other rate as may be recommended by the Foundation, of the 
Federal Fund Target Rate as of the first business day of the IOLTA account earnings 
period, which rate is deemed to be net of allowable reasonable service charges or fees, 
on an IOLTA account. 
Id. 
 65. Compare N.M. BAR R. 24-109(B)(3)(a)(iii) (“[E]ligible institutions [must] . . . pay an 
amount on funds that would otherwise qualify for the investment options noted in Subparagraph 
(c) of Subparagraph (3) of this paragraph equal to fifty-five percent (55%) of the federal funds 
targeted rate as of the first business day of the month or other IOLTA remitting period . . . .”), with 
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(o)(3) (“An approved eligible financial institution must 
pay no less on IOLTA accounts than (i) the highest earnings rate generally available from the 
institution to its non-IOLTA customers on each IOLTA account . . . or, (ii) 80% of the Federal 
Funds Target Rate on all its IOLTA accounts.”). 
 66. See CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(3)(A); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(1)(C); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(4); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 21, § 7000.9(b)(1)–(2); N.C. BAR R. ch. 1, subch. D. § 1317(b)(3); S.C. APP. CT. R. 
412; TEX. ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUND. R. 7(a)(3); WASH. RULES FOR ENF’T LAW. CONDUCT R. 
15.7(e)(1)(iii).  In particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court amended its IOLTA rules to pair a rate 
floor with its FFTR percentage rule, citing to economic circumstances that projected the FFTR to 
remain at 0.00%.  Supplemental Administrative Determination, Regarding IOLTA and the Best 
Customer Standard, N.J. SUP. CT., Feb. 18, 2009. 
 67. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(4). 
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minimum.68  Other states offer slight variations or limitations on this type of rate 
rule.69 
Because it is a monetary policy tool set by the Federal Reserve, the FFTR, 
which controls IOLTA interest under these rules, is inherently subject to change 
over time.70  Since the end of 2008, however, the rate has remained historically 
anomalous—and low.71  As economic crisis loomed in late 2007, the FOMC 
began a series of dramatic cuts to the FFTR, and set a “near-zero target rate” for 
the FFT toward the end of 2008.72  This rate target was the lowest ever set,73 and 
has remained static since 2008.74 
The Federal Reserve has employed other strategies to bolster the economy, 
including a “quantitative easing” strategy of purchasing United States Treasury 
securities to keep borrowing costs low.75  In October 2014, six years after 
introducing the strategy, the Federal Reserve announced that the progress of the 
country’s economic recovery was sufficient to discontinue quantitative easing,76 
but it does not appear to have changed its FFTR strategy.77  Although the FOMC 
has recently commented on positive economic trends that signal a future change 
in this policy, it stated “that it plans to keep short-term interest rates low for a 
‘considerable’ time.”78 
Because rates are expected to remain low for a considerable time, IOLTA 
deposit rates based on the FFTR are likely to remain low as well.  In turn, legal 
                                                 
 68. See Approved IOLTA Depositories, MASS. IOLTA, http://www.maiolta.org/financial/ 
depositories.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2014) (stating that banks “choosing the Safe Harbor rate 
are helping to meet the legal needs of Massachusetts residents by insuring their rate maintains a 
minimum level at all times and increases with other market rates”). 
 69. See, e.g., NEV. SUP. CT. R. 217(2) (West 2014).   Nevada’s formulation is a slight variation 
that allows banks to pay a minimum rate “[e]qual to the Federal Fund Target Rate, or, the Federal 
Discount Rate plus .50 percent.”  Id.  Kentucky allows banks the option to pay IOLTA interest at 
the rate of seventy percent of the FFTR, but only if the FFTR is between one and four percent. KY. 
SUP. CT. R. 3.830(5) (West 2014). 
 70. See Open Market Operations, supra note 20 (showing the fluctuation in historical 
FFTRs). 
 71. Id. (indicating that FFTRs since “late 2008” represent historic lows for an extended period 
of time). 
 72. Id.  The rationale for this rate setting policy is further discussed in Part I.B.2 
 73. Neil Irwin, Fed Cuts Key Rate to Record Low, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121601754.html. 
 74. Open Market Operations, supra note 20. 
 75. Binyamin Appelbaum, Federal Reserve Caps Its Bond Purchases; Focus Turns to Interest 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/business/federal-reserve-
janet-yellen-qe-announcement.html; see also Brett W. Fawley & Luciana Juvenal, Quantitative 
Easing: Lessons We’ve Learned, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, July 2012, at 8, available at 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/legacy_assets/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2012/c/QE.pdf. 
 76. Appelbaum, supra note 75. 
 77. Alain Sherter, Moneywatch: Fed Vows to Keep Interest Rates Low for “Considerable” 
Time, CBS MONEYWATCH (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fed-
vows-to-keep-interest-rates-low-for-considerable-time. 
 78. Id. 
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aid programs that rely on IOLTA interest income face diminished funding.79  Yet 
with few exceptions, state IOLTA organizations have not changed IOLTA rules 
in response to static, low interest rates. 80   
C.  Factors Affecting Eligible Bank Participation 
Banks are an indispensable part of the IOLTA program: they create attorneys’ 
IOLTA accounts, accept and account for deposits made to the accounts, 
calculate and credit interest earned, and pay that interest to the appropriate legal 
aid organization.81  Bank participation, however, is not mandatory.82  Instead, 
the terms governing eligibility to offer IOLTA accounts are contained in the 
rules promulgated by the relevant rulemaking authority in each state.83  IOLTA 
rules typically refer to such banks as “participating,” 84 “eligible,” or “approved” 
institutions.85  The basis for this institutional eligibility differs by state.  For 
example, in North Dakota and Rhode Island, any bank that does business in the 
respective state is eligible to participate in IOLTA.86  Some states, such as 
Oregon and Vermont, have IOLTA rules that condition a bank’s eligibility on 
the execution of an explicit agreement that the bank reports certain types of 
transaction activity on an IOLTA account.87  But the most common provision, 
                                                 
 79. Robert J. Derocher, The IOLTA Crash: Fallout for Foundations, A.B.A. BAR LEADER, 
Sept.–Oct. 2012, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/2012_13/ 
september_october/iolta_crash_fallout_foundations.html (last visited September 14, 2014). 
 80. The New Jersey Supreme Court revised its IOLTA rate comparability rule in 2009, noting 
that “[i]n light of the ‘floating’ Federal Funds Target Rate being grounded at 0.00%, there is a need 
for immediate action to assist banks seeking guidance about how to meet the Best Customer [rate 
comparability] Standard.”  Supplemental Administrative Determination, Regarding IOLTA and the 
Best Customer Standard, N.J. SUP. CT. (Feb. 18, 2009).  The Kentucky rule, which only permits 
banks to use the FFTR as a rate-setting guide when the FFTR is between one and four percent, 
would not allow a bank to rely on that provision today.  See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830(5). 
 81. See Derocher, supra note 79 (explaining how few states have found success in changing 
how IOLTA programs are funded). 
 82. See Info for Banks, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/info-for-banks (last visited Sept. 
18, 2014). 
 83. See supra Part I.A. 
 84. See KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830(3)–(5). 
 85. See DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(12)(A) (West 2014). 
 86. See N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(f)(4) (West 2014) (“An eligible financial 
institution is a bank, savings bank, trust company, savings and loan association, savings association, 
credit union, or federally regulated investment company authorized by federal or state law to do 
business in North Dakota and insured by [the proper relevant body].”); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.15(f)(4) (West 2014) (“IOLTA accounts may be established with any financial 
institution authorized by federal or state law to do business in Rhode Island.”). 
 87. See VT. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.15B(d) (West 2014) (stating that eligible banks 
must “notify Disciplinary Counsel whenever (1) any properly payable instrument is presented 
against such a trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the 
instrument is honored; and (2) whenever any transaction, no matter the type, causes such an account 
to be overdrawn”). 
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by far, requires banks to comply with established rate comparability rules in 
order to maintain their status as eligible institutions.88 
Although banks are not obligated by rule to participate as IOLTA depository 
institutions, there are incentives for bank participation: 
[F]inancial institutions receive a benefit under the IOLTA system 
(since they can utilize the funds at a higher rate of return than the 
interest paid to the nonprofit organization) . . . .  As there is strong 
competition between financial institutions, it is likely that institutions 
not offering IOLTA type accounts will totally lose use of the funds 
because lawyers will move accounts to institutions providing such 
services.89 
In addition, participation in IOLTA programs earns banks Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit, which is an important factor in determining a 
bank’s eligibility to expand in certain markets or participate in a merger or 
acquisition.90 
Nothing in the IOLTA rules prohibits any institution from paying a rate higher 
than that guaranteed by a state’s minimum IOLTA rate provisions.  Highlighting 
the competition of deposits described above, many state IOLTA programs and 
bar associations provide special recognition to institutions that offer interest 
rates for IOLTA accounts that are higher than the minimum rate prescribed by 
the rules.91  This recognition encourages attorneys to reward these “honor roll” 
banks by choosing to house their IOLTA accounts and other business with the 
banks.92 
Oregon and Texas, for example, are two states with IOLTA programs that 
have taken an active and organized approach to encourage banks to pay higher 
than minimum interest rates on IOLTA accounts.93  The Oregon Law 
                                                 
 88. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 89. Betsy Borden Johnson, “With Liberty and Justice for All”: IOLTA in Texas—The Texas 
Equal Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 725, 727 (1985). 
 90. See Thom Weidlich, IOLTAs Can Be Good Way to Build Deposits, AM. BANKER (June 7, 
2004, 5:48 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/special-reports/169_16/-223736-1.html; see 
also About Us: Community Reinvestment Act, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://www.stlouisfed. 
org/community_development/cra.cfm#main (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (“An institution’s record 
of meeting the credit needs . . . is taken into consideration . . . when [it] seeks to expand through 
merger acquisition or branching.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Info for Banks, supra note 82 (“Many IOLTA programs publicly recognize 
financial institutions that treat IOLTA favorably.  Some states have an ‘Honor Roll’ for financial 
institutions, and other states provide different forms of recognition.  Several states also present 
awards at bar association functions . . . .”). 
 92. See, e.g., Information for Lawyers, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.oregonlawfoundation.org/ 
lawyers.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (“You can help the Oregon Law Foundation by 
establishing your IOLTA account at (or moving your IOLTA account to) a bank that is committed 
to maximizing the rate of return on IOLTA accounts.  The Oregon Law Foundation’s ‘Leadership 
Banks’ have shown such a commitment.”). 
 93. Ken Smith et al., Partnership Bank Programs: Maximizing IOLTA Revenue in Difficult 
Times, A.B.A. DIALOGUE MAG., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ 
2015] A Good Rule, Poorly Written 741 
Foundation’s “Leadership Bank” program provides special recognition and 
benefits to banks that voluntarily paid higher rates on IOLTA accounts.94  As of 
2012, it boasted bank participation that included “one out of every three Oregon 
banks” and “five of [the] 10 biggest banks.”95  The effect of this participation 
was that “69[%] of all IOLTA deposits are in . . . [b]anks, paying [an] average 
net yield of 0.71[%] compared with . . . 0.10[%] estimated yield that these banks 
pay their non IOLTA customers holding comparable accounts.”96 
The Texas Access to Justice Foundation (TAJF) implemented its “Prime 
Partners” program in 2007 to attract and reward banks paying higher IOLTA 
rates.97  As in Oregon, participating banks in Texas paid at least one percent 
interest on IOLTA accounts, and earned special recognition and benefits.98  In 
2012, TAJF said that additional IOLTA revenue attributable to the higher rates 
paid by its “Prime Partner” banks was $1.5 million, which “is sufficient to fund 
30 additional legal aid lawyers at the national average salary of $50,000 per 
year.”99 
Many large national banks do not elect to compete for IOLTA deposits by 
offering higher rates than those required by rule, but still manage to retain a large 
share of the overall IOLTA market.100  Despite its previous recognition of 
                                                 
dialogue/ls_dial_su12_iolta1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited April 9, 2015) (“The Leadership Bank 
program has achieved its goal of maximizing IOLTA revenue while also maintaining the excellent 
working partnership of the banking and legal communities. It builds on the positive banking 
relationships that Oregon IOLTA has developed through its sustained efforts over many years.”). 
 94. Id.  These benefits are summarized on the website of the Oregon Law Foundation: 
Participation in IOLTA can be seen as a community service by banks and can result in 
favorable coverage by the media.  Since Oregon lawyers are committed to access to 
justice issues and funding, some financial institutions in Oregon use their IOLTA 
accounts as a way to attract new customers.  In addition, the Oregon Law Foundation 
will promote among attorneys the patronage of financial institutions in which IOLTA 
accounts will generate funds for legal services to the poor, including assisting attorneys 
in locating Leadership Banks in their area. 
Info for Banks, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.oregonlawfoundation.org/banks.html (last visited Nov. 
14, 2014). 
 95. Smith et al., supra note 93. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. In its pitch to obtain involvement of Texas banks, 
TAJF crafted a bold proposition: Pay more than required under comparability and your 
bank will be highly publicized in the legal community as a “Prime Partner,” willing to 
comply and to go above and beyond for the benefit of low income people who need 
access to our civil justice system. 
Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Beverly Michaelis, Speak up for IOLTA – Tell U.S. Bank What You Think, OR. 
L. PRAC. MGMT. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://oregonlawpracticemanagement.com/2011/08/01/speak-up-
for-iolta-tell-us-bank-what-you-think/ (“U.S. Bank holds more IOLTA accounts in Oregon than 
any other banking institution.”). 
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successful efforts to build large bank participation,101 the Oregon Legal 
Foundation noted that “U.S. Bank . . . [is] decreasing its IOLTA interest rate 
from 0.7% to a tiered average of 0.13%.  This decrease . . . will result in a [twenty 
percent] loss in annual IOLTA revenue or $160,000 for 2014.”102  Big bank 
participation in the Texas “Prime Partners” program also diminished at the onset 
of the Financial Crisis.103  Other banks may avoid or reconsider participation in 
IOLTA based on rate considerations.  In 2010, JP Morgan Chase ended its 
participation in the New Jersey IOLTA program because it did not wish to 
comply with rate comparability provisions.104 
D.  Diminishing IOLTA Revenues After 2007 and State Responses 
Because IOLTA program revenues ordinarily tend to fluctuate in concert with 
the central interest rates set by the Federal Reserve,105 the IOLTA program is a 
procyclical phenomenon that tends to mirror the overall strength of the 
American economy.106  As a result of the Federal Reserve’s ongoing efforts to 
keep borrowing rates low, and banks’ ensuing action to lower interest rates to 
preserve net interest margins, IOLTA interest revenues rapidly declined after 
2007 and remain at historic lows.107  This phenomenon has been widely 
recognized by the legal community, which has felt its practical effect over the 
last six years: when interest rates are depressed for extended periods of time, 
reduced IOLTA revenues affect the delivery of legal aid services that rely on 
IOLTA revenues.108  The effect is further compounded by the inherent risk of 
volatility caused by related economic factors, such as the relative strength of the 
housing market.109 
                                                 
 101. See Smith et al., supra note 93 (“Oregon’s program demonstrates that these relationships 
can even be forged with large banks like Wells Fargo and US Bank that hold the bulk of IOLTA 
deposits.”). 
 102. President’s Report in 2013 Annual Report, OR. L. FOUND., http://www. 
oregonlawfoundation.org/docs/OLFAR.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
 103. See Smith et al., supra note 93 (“After the Fed Rate dropped to near zero, three of the five 
biggest banks dropped out of the program.”). 
 104. Brian T. Murray, N.J. Attorneys, Law Firms Pull Client Trust Accounts Held by Chase, 
N.J. STAR LEDGER (August 2, 2010, 8:54 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2010/ 
08/attorneys_pulling_client_trust.html. 
 105. See Chris Tweeten, Legal Services Needs Your Help, MONT. LAW., April 2009, at 4, 
available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.montanabar.org/resource/collection/EAA30F23-4767-
49DA-BBE7-152CF93C8535/April2009MTLawyer.pdf (noting how IOLTA funds are reduced as 
the Federal Reserve’s “benchmark interest rate” falls). 
 106. Carter, supra note 5. 
 107. Id.  Interest Rates, IOLTA.ORG, http://www.iolta.org/what-is-iolta/items-interest-rates 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
 108. Id.; see also Kathleen A. McKee, The Impact of the Current Economy on Access to 
Justice, 62 ME. L. REV. 613, 629 n.38 (2010) (explaining how interest rate reductions led to a drop 
in the projected funding for legal services to the underprivileged in Virginia). 
 109. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 465–66.  Stevenson explains that: 
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The extent of IOLTA revenue reduction is remarkable.  “In Texas, IOLTA 
revenue has dropped from $20 million in 2007 to an estimated $4.4 million in 
2012—an 80 percent decline.”110  The District of Columbia Bar Foundation 
reported that between 2008 and 2014, its IOLTA revenue fell from 
approximately $2.4 million to $539,898, despite a net increase of over 700 
accounts.111  Florida, a state hit hard by the Financial Crisis, saw “IOLTA 
revenue tumble 88[%] over the last five years, from $44 million to $5.5 
million.”112 
States have been affected by IOLTA rate declines in varying degrees, but 
“layoffs, salary cuts, and office closures for organizations providing civil legal 
services to the poor continue to unfold across the country,” as legal aid providers 
face mounting demand and shriveling IOLTA funds.113  According to the 
American Bar Association (ABA) statistics, in just the first four years of the 
recession, “IOLTA grants to legal service providers nationwide from 2008 to 
2011[] plung[ed] from $231 million to $106 million.”114 
The procyclical nature of IOLTA rates and program funding tends to suggest 
that rates and revenue can be expected to be at their lowest when the overall 
health of the economy is at its poorest.115  Additionally, there is evidence that 
demand for legal services remains the same or even increases when the economy 
is relatively weak, and legal aid funding from IOLTA is depressed; for example, 
“South Jersey Legal Services, which covers seven counties, will lay off five 
attorneys and close two offices beginning in January.” 116  As a result, “[i]t 
                                                 
[M]ost IOLTA deposits are from real estate transactions, so a downturn in the real estate 
market means fewer IOLTA deposits to generate interest.  Depressed property values 
shrink the size of the IOLTA deposits that do come in, further depleting the funds.  Many 
IOLTA programs try to mitigate these problems by having the entity that receives and 
distributes the funds engage in regular charitable fundraising and apply for grants from 
other private foundations or government entities. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 110. Derocher, supra note 79.  According to Derocher, state IOLTA resources have been 
decimated: “Less than five years after receiving $1.9 million in IOLTA revenue, the Boston Bar 
Foundation . . . [received] $600,000 in IOLTA funds in 2011—a nearly 70 percent decline.  The 
Montana Justice Foundation, which received $1 million via IOLTA in 2007, expects just $160,000 
in such revenue in 2012-13.”  Id. 
 111. Catherine Ho, D.C. IOLTA Program Struggles Amid Low Interest Rates, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/dc-iolta-program-
struggles-amid-low-interest-rates/2014/09/05/d769c672-33b7-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story. 
html. 
 112. Derocher, supra note 79. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Matt Katz, Financial Crisis Harms Legal Aid for N.J. Poor, States Facing Deep Fund 
Shortage, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 27, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-09-27/news/25247 
143_1_legal-aid-interest-rates-housing-market. 
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expects to provide legal help to 9,000 people next year, down from 12,000 this 
year.”117 
Some legal aid programs that typically rely on IOLTA have been able to find 
other sources of income to offset the impact of rate reductions.  The Maryland 
Legal Services Corporation, for example, was able to partially offset a fifteen 
percent reduction in IOLTA revenue in 2013 by successfully petitioning the 
legislature for court filing fees and increased allocation from other state funds.118  
In 2009, Texas’ TAJF successfully petitioned the state legislature for $20 million 
in funding that year.119  In Alabama, where IOLTA revenues to the Alabama 
Law Foundation declined by sixty-two percent between 2008 and 2014, 
attorneys were encouraged to make a fifty-dollar, tax-deductible contribution in 
conjunction with the payment of annual assessments to the Client Security 
Fund.120 
The Department of Justice’s recent settlement with Bank of America, in the 
wake of an investigation into mortgage-backed securities, requires Bank of 
America to pay $30 million into IOLTA programs across the country, 
representing a significant windfall for these programs.121  In some states, “cy 
pres” awards, or “residual funds from class actions[,] [are] now given wholly or 
partially to legal services.”122  For instance, in 2010, “Texas’ IOLTA . . . 
received $2.6 million [from] cy pres funds,” and “$1.38 million in cy pres cash 
flowed into the Montana Justice Foundation.”123 
Despite these attempts to obtain alternative sources of funding, IOLTA 
programs continue to struggle under depressed interest rates.124  Until IOLTA 
account revenues increase, state legal aid programs will need to continue 
                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2013), available at 
http://mlsc.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/MLSC_AR2013.pdf (noting that despite these 
additional income sources, Maryland’s operating grants were cut by five percent).  Maryland’s 
IOLTA income for 2013 was $2.1 million, compared to $6.4 million in IOLTA revenues in 2007.  
Id.; see also MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.mlsc.org/2007AnnualReport.pdf (describing 2007 IOLTA revenues). 
 119. Carter, supra note 5. 
 120. Alabama Law Foundation Added to Client Security Fund Statement, ALA. L. FOUND., 
http://www.alabamalawfoundation.org/2014/03/25/alabama-law-foundation-contribution-added-
to-client-security-fund-statement/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).  Reductions in funding to the 
Alabama Law Foundation “forced [it] to cut grants to the Volunteer Lawyers Programs, Legal 
Services Alabama and other grantees by 20%.”  Id.  Additionally, Alabama’s “five Volunteer 
Lawyers Programs had already received cuts of 40% in Legal Services Corporation funding.”  Id. 
 121. Catherine Ho, Legal Aid Groups to Get $30 Million from Bank Settlement, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/legal-aid-groups-toget-
30-million-from-bank-settlement/2014/08/27/8b0cbc96-2d61-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story. 
html. 
 122. Carter, supra note 5. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Derocher, supra note 79. 
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identifying alternative funding sources to supplement their revenues or face 
reductions to their programs.125 
II.  THE EXTRAORDINARY ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS REVEALED THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT IOLTA RULES 
A.  They Never Saw It Coming 
When states first began to adopt IOLTA rules, they did so in an economic 
environment that was markedly different than the present.126  In the twenty-five 
years preceding Florida’s implementation of the first IOLTA program in 1981, 
the average prime lending rate was over seven percent.127  After 1981, the prime 
rate remained at least six percent in every year until 2002.128 
In 1997, when Indiana finally adopted IOLTA, the last state in the country to 
do so, the average net interest margin at United States banks was above four 
percent.129  The average interest paid on a one-month certificate of deposit 
between 1981 and 1999 was over seven percent.130  Net interest margins 
remained above 3.75% until 2003.131  In these conditions, it would be reasonable 
to expect that IOLTA deposits would earn more than a nominal rate of return.  It 
was in this stable and ordinary economic climate that IOLTA rules were 
adopted, with rate-setting language that reflected the market at the time of 
adoption.132 
With the most severe economic catastrophe of the twentieth century, the Great 
Depression, forty years in the past, it is likely that the states did not foresee 
another sustained period of economic recession or imagine how a recession 
might have such a profound effect on IOLTA programs.  But the current 
recession shows how IOLTA’s rate rules, which worked so well in ordinary 
times, have done little to ensure consistent delivery of IOLTA revenues to legal 
aid programs.133 
                                                 
 125. Katz, supra note 116; see also Derocher, supra note 79. 
 126. See Carter, supra note 5; Derocher, supra note 79. 
 127. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, supra note 49. 
 128. Id.  Rates remained between four percent and five percent until 2005, when average prime 
rates rose again to over six percent. 
 129. Net Interest Margin for All U.S. Banks, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http:// 
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNIM (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Information for 
Participating Financial Institutions, IND. BAR FOUND., http://www.inbf.org/IOLTA/ 
InformationforFinancialInstitutions/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited April 9, 2015). 
 130. Selected Interest Rate: Historical Data, supra note 49. 
 131. Net Interest Margin for All U.S. Banks, supra note 129. 
 132. See supra Part I.B.1; see also supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra Part I.D. 
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B.  Current IOLTA Rules Permit Federal Monetary Policy to Undermine the 
Just Ideals of IOLTA 
There is no question that the purpose of IOLTA programs, to provide funding 
for legal aid services, is clear.134  But the rate rules, read in light of the current 
interest rate environment, beg the question: was IOLTA income intended to be 
a stable and sustainable source of support for needy citizens seeking access to 
justice in all economic conditions, or was it simply a charitable allocation to be 
made when the Federal Reserve sets interest rates high enough?  While focusing 
on the nation’s big-picture economic woes, the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy has unintentionally decimated IOLTA revenue—at a time when demand 
for legal aid is likely at its highest.135 
The broad acceptance of IOLTA’s mission, to provide legal assistance to the 
neediest Americans, supports the idea that IOLTA interest rates should not be 
tied to a monetary policy capable of radically lowering deposit rates.136  The 
vigor with which IOLTA was implemented and defended against constitutional 
challenges, tends to suggest that the legal community, as well as the sanctioning 
states, not only believe strongly in the underlying program purpose, but also 
have an interest in the IOLTA rate mechanisms themselves.137  Rate setting 
provisions based on FFTR, which result in an IOLTA rate floor, may also imply 
the states’ intent to specifically protect IOLTA accounts.138 
Banks may reasonably counter that there is an inherent logic in keeping 
IOLTA rates in lockstep with the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, rather than 
using some independent rate setting methodology.  After all, the FFTR does not 
simply reflect market interest rate conditions, but actually influences them.139  
Furthermore, unless a bank decides to lend at higher interest rates than the 
                                                 
 134. See supra Part I.A. 
 135. See supra Part I.D.  Tragically, as Derocher notes, “the funding downturn came at a time 
of reduced federal aid to legal aid programs, coupled with increased public demand for such 
services from people facing unemployment, home foreclosure, and related economic crises.”  
Derocher, supra note 79. 
 136. See supra Part I.A.  It took only sixteen years to implement it in all fifty states after Florida 
implemented the first IOLTA program in 1971.  Petition of N.H. Bar Ass’n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1259 
(N.H. 1982). 
 137. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 466 (2010) (discussing appellate court challenges to 
IOLTA in Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163 (1998); Washington Legal Found. v. 
Legal Found. of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Legal 
Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice 
Found., 94 F.3d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1996); Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 
968–69 (1st Cir. 1993); Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1003 (11th Cir. 1987)).  For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 
noted that the “change from the tradition that no interest was obtained from lawyers’ trust 
accounts,” occurred because “in the 1970’s, interest rates reached unprecedented high levels.”  
Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 868–69. 
 138. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 139. Federal Open Market Committee, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
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prevailing competitive market rates, it likely cannot afford to pay higher interest 
rates without compressing its net interest margin—its largest source of income—
or finding another way to offset the higher interest paid to IOLTA.140  A 
declining net interest margin could adversely impact banks with less diversified 
sources of revenue, particularly smaller banks.141 
Bank performance data, however, does not suggest that interest margin 
compression has made it impossible for banks to afford paying higher IOLTA 
rates.142  Because the FFTR is both a descriptive and prescriptive monetary 
policy tool that addresses macroeconomic factors that extend beyond the 
financial services sector of the economy,143 bank performance (unlike IOLTA 
rates) does not move in lockstep with the FFTR.144  In fact, many banks, despite 
a completely static federal monetary policy, have shown positive financial 
performance trends since 2008.145  Even if one takes the conservative position 
that IOLTA interest rates should be predicated on the banks’ capacities to afford 
them, this financial performance data tends to support a conclusion that bank 
profitability, rather than Federal Reserve rates, is a more accurate measure of 
what rates banks can afford to pay.146 
                                                 
 140. See DeYoung & Rice, supra note 44, at 35 (explaining how most banks’ interest margins 
are their primary source of profits). 
 141. See A Quick Comparison Of Interest Margins For The Largest U.S. Banks, FORBES (Sept. 
11, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/09/11/a-quick-com 
parison-of-interest-margins-for-the-largest-u-s-banks/ (explaining that banks without diverse 
revenue streams have suffered greater losses from contracting interest rates than their more 
diversified competitors). 
 142. See JAN SCHILDACH & CLAUDIUS WENZEL, BANK PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. AND 
EUROPE: AN OCEAN APART 7 (2013), available at https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/ 
DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000320825.pdf.  The bank performance data shows 
that: 
US banks’ revenues—though lacking meaningful growth—have constantly been above 
pre-crisis levels in recent years. Despite suffering from a decline in the interest margin 
of late, net interest income is still substantially higher than before the onset of the crisis, 
thanks to lower funding costs and, more recently, increased portfolios of debt securities 
and an uptick in lending volumes . . . . 
Id. 
 143. See Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm (last updated Oct. 8, 
2014).  The Committee’s broad assessment includes all aspects of the economy, such as labor, 
capital markets, and housing.  Id. 
 144. Compare SCHILDACH & WENZEL, supra note 142, at 3 (showing that U.S. bank 
performance has improved markedly since 2008), with Open Market Operations, supra note 20 
(showing that the FFTR has been essentially flat and near zero since the end of 2008). 
 145. See SCHILDACH & WENZEL, supra note 142, at 3. 
 146. See id. at 1, 7 (noting that U.S. banks are experiencing “stable revenues that are 
significantly above pre-crisis levels”); Smith et al., supra note 93 (acknowledging that Texas’ 
“Prime Partners banks” paid more than the “safe harbor” rate on IOLTA accounts (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
748 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:729 
C.  Current IOLTA Rules Do Not Provide Consistent, Logical Incentives for 
Participating Banks 
Every bank that participates in IOLTA derives at least two benefits: first, the 
deposits themselves provide banks funding to make loans and generate interest 
income; and, second, opening an IOLTA account provides opportunities for 
contact between the attorneys and the banks, which affords the banks the 
opportunity to earn profitable non-IOLTA business from the attorneys.147  
However, assuming all other factors are equal, banks offering higher-than-
minimum rates experience higher costs in deriving these benefits because those 
banks would theoretically expect a lower net interest margin unless they charged 
higher interest rates on loans—potentially making it a less attractive place to do 
business.148 
The rules governing bank participation in IOLTA programs have created a 
curious state of affairs.  “Honor roll[s]” published by state bar associations and 
legal aid corporations recognize banks that elect to voluntarily pay higher rates 
on IOLTA accounts.149  However, the names of the largest national banks do not 
consistently appear on these lists.150  The listed banks are most often local or 
regional banks rather than large national banks.151  Although large banks 
participate in IOLTA, they often pay only the minimum rates necessary to 
participate under state IOLTA rules.152  However, despite this tendency to pay 
lower IOLTA rates, big banks may still control a predominant share of the 
                                                 
 147. Johnson, supra note 89, at 727 (stating that banks “can utilize [IOLTA] funds at a higher 
rate of return than the interest paid to the nonprofit [legal aid] organization,” and competition 
between banks makes it “likely that institutions not offering IOLTA type accounts will totally lose 
use of the [the nonprofits] funds because lawyers will move accounts to institutions providing such 
services”). 
 148. See DeYoung & Rice, supra note 44, at 34, 38, 40–42 (explaining how despite the 
increasing rate of noninterest income in bank profits, banks still heavily rely on interest-based 
accounts). 
 149. See, e.g., IOLTA Honor Roll, MD. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://mlsc.org/iolta-honor-roll/ 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014) (listing the banks on Maryland’s “IOLTA Honor Roll”). 
 150. See, e.g., id.; NC IOLTA Eligible Bank List, N.C. IOLTA, http://www.nciolta.com/ 
iolta_banklist.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (recognizing ten banks in North Carolina paying a 
higher IOLTA rate: Albemarle Bank & Trust, Bank of North Carolina, Bank of Oak Ridge, Coastal 
Bank & Trust, LifeStore Bank, Macon Bank, Old Town Bank, Providence Bank, Roxboro Savings 
Bank, and Towne Bank). 
 151. See, e.g., supra note 150. 
 152. See, e.g., IOLTA Honor Roll, supra note 149 (showing that HSBC Bank USA is the only 
national bank that “agreed to pay a net yield of the greater of [one percent] or [sixty-five percent] 
or more of the federal funds target rate on IOLTA deposits”).  While some large national banks 
elect to pay a higher IOLTA rate, they may not choose to do so consistently across all markets; 
Wells Fargo Bank pays at least one percent on IOLTA accounts in Oregon, but not in Maryland.  
Compare Where You Bank Matters, OR. L. FOUND., http://www.oregonlawfoundation.org/ 
docs/LeadershipBanks.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), with IOLTA Honor Roll, supra note 149 
(declining to list Wells Fargo on Maryland’s “IOLTA Honor Roll”). 
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IOLTA deposits in some states.153  This could reduce the potential revenue 
impact of IOLTA funds statewide.154 
Counterintuitively, the current rules permit large banks to derive the principal 
advantages of IOLTA participation—deposit funding and opportunities to 
obtain and retain attorneys’ business—while often paying the lowest IOLTA 
rates required by rule.155  Smaller banks, which often pay a higher IOLTA rate 
than the minimum required by state rules,156 bear a higher interest expense 
burden without enjoying a tangible competitive advantage.157 
III.  IOLTA REGULATIONS NEED, AND DESERVE, TEETH 
Since 2008, the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve has exposed an 
obvious flaw in the rules that govern IOLTA programs.  The FFTR, a useful tool 
in governing macroeconomic monetary policy and access to credit, is not a 
sensible basis to determine the funding of IOLTA programs.  By making IOLTA 
interest rates dependent on rates set by the Federal Reserve, states have 
guaranteed that income from IOLTA programs will, at best, be unpredictable.  
At worst, IOLTA revenues will be depressed during sustained periods of 
economic difficulty—periods when the need for legal aid funding tends to 
increase.  Either scenario presents a challenge to the funding and administration 
of state legal aid programs.  States have employed stopgap approaches to 
alternative funding instead of considering rule changes that would substantially 
bolster, or at least stabilize, IOLTA interest revenues.158  But many of these 
stopgap measures, such as legislative grants or additional court filing fees, shift 
the burden of legal aid funding from banks to the public. 
The simplest proposed rule change is to tighten the terms of banks 
participation in IOLTA programs without prescribing any actual changes to rate 
setting provisions of the controlling rules.  Because banks are free to determine 
whether they participate in IOLTA, and whether to offer a higher rate than 
mandated by the state rules, state IOLTA programs should develop bank 
participation standards that reward banks that choose to voluntarily pay a higher 
rate of interest than the rate paid to comparable non-IOLTA accounts.159  The 
rulemaking authority in each state should revise participation standards to 
require that banks pay an “honor roll” rate in order to offer IOLTA account 
services. 
                                                 
 153. See Smith et al., supra note 93; see also Michaelis, supra note 100 (noting that U.S. Bank 
holds the greatest number of Oregon’s IOLTA accounts). 
 154. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra Part I.C. 
 156. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Katz, supra note 116 (discussing alterations Pennsylvania made to IOLTA rules to 
address the low interest rate effects). 
 159. See Smith et al., supra note 93 (explaining how Oregon banks can obtain benefits paying 
higher returns on IOLTA accounts). 
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By limiting provision of IOLTA services exclusively to banks that voluntarily 
pay higher IOLTA interest rates, two beneficial outcomes may occur.  First, the 
resulting participant banks will attain a larger deposit base not only through 
IOLTA accounts, but also through the commercial deposits of attorneys who use 
them.160  If larger national banks determine that IOLTA deposits are a necessary 
part of their business, then they would have to pay a higher rate, and bear an 
equivalent burden to obtain them.  Second, limiting participation to banks that 
pay an established rate will ensure that legal aid revenues, which are supported 
by IOLTA interest income, are not only higher than current levels, but also more 
predictable in the future.161 
Other proposals may address the minimum rate-setting rule directly.  One idea 
that would ensure the most consistent delivery of IOLTA revenues would be the 
establishment of a fixed statutory rate similar to the fixed, flat rate established 
by the optional Texas Prime Partners program.162  Legal aid services will benefit 
from a far more predictable source of revenue each year, which will permit long-
term planning and staffing.163  Banks also stand to benefit from a modest fixed 
IOLTA rate.  If, for example, a state set the IOLTA rate at one percent by rule, 
banks would feel interest margin pressure for the near future; but years from 
now, when prime lending rates rise again, a fixed IOLTA rate will actually 
improve the net interest margin.164   Such a proposal stands in contrast to current 
comparability provisions, and states need to address this issue. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The current IOLTA program is a noble idea, but its rules were not drafted to 
ensure a consistent source of revenue through difficult economic conditions.  
Instead, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, which is intended to repair 
economic difficulties, adversely affects the interest income earned by IOLTA 
programs.  For as long as interest rates remain depressed, or if low rates persist 
again in the future, legal aid programs that substantially rely on IOLTA will 
continue to suffer. 
                                                 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. (explaining how Oregon’s “Leadership Banks program” provided greater IOLTA 
funding predictability). 
 162. See, e.g., id. (discussing how Texas’ Prime Partners program sets “a flat 1.0[%]” rate for 
its participants). 
 163. See id. (discussing the impact of the increased revenue from the Texas Prime Partners 
program). 
 164. Because net interest margin is the difference between what a bank makes on loan interest 
and what it pays on deposits, if a bank pays out more on IOLTA deposits under current interest 
rates, its net interest margin would be squeezed.  See Greg Edwards, Banks Face Continuing Net 
Interest Margins Pressure, ST. LOUIS BIZ TALK (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
stlouis/blog/2012/12/banks-face-continuing-net-interest.html (explaining how net interest margins 
work).  However, once the interest rates rise again, if the IOLTA accounts rates are set at a low 
rate, the banks’ interest margin on the accounts will increase.  See id. 
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States have the authority to determine the rules of their respective IOLTA 
plans and the terms of the banks’ participation.  By updating the rules to plan for 
economic volatility, or at least governing participation standards to reward 
model bank behavior, states can continue to fulfill the vital mission of providing 
legal aid services, particularly in sour economic climates, when they are most 
needed. 
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